More and more studies highlight the limits of state-building conducted 'from the top-down'. Building on the literature on the subject and using a Rosenauian concept in a novel way, this article posits that international interventions tend to create a
Introduction
There is an emerging trend in the literature on state-building that identifies the significant limits of state-building when unrelated to the needs and perceptions of the local society targeted by the intervention. External actors necessarily affect the socio-political processes of the target state. It is not the case that nation-building implies interference while state-building focused on institutions does not; no matter how one defines the terms, an international intervention necessarily implies a degree of interference. In that regard and as I have argued elsewhere, the common cliché saying that it is possible to undertake state-building activities without embarking in nation-building appears international interveners on the one hand and segments of local population and local actors on the other. The massive arrival of staff involved in international governance will create a social gap between the international and the local 'worlds', which will in turn fuel local resistance as this gap will become target of narratives of resistance by certain local actors. This article posits that we could understand and use one of James Rosenau'
seminal contributions -the bifurcation of the two worlds -in a novel way in the context of international interventions. Building on the literature of the subject, one could argue that direct governance of war-torn territories is hardly compatible with the objective of fostering and nurturing legitimacy in an externally-led state-building project. In that regard, the 'political' and 'social' worlds seem far apart -the political response, namely direct governance, seems unfit to adequately address the social challenges of postwar state-building. However, more than just an academic metaphor, the 'bifurcation of the two worlds' can be understood as a practical assessment of the situation in Kosovo and
Timor-Leste. The difference in the living standards between the 'internationals' and the 'locals', as well as the 'white car syndrome', a concept developed in this contribution, will come to exemplify concretely the exogenous character of the international missions.
As observed and analysed under the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK; from 1999) and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET; , local actors will tap into the discontent to mobilize sections of the local population against the United Nations, in a scenario that appeared unlikely back in 1999 when the UN benefited from high levels of local support in Kosovo or in TimorLeste.
This article takes the stance that perception is in itself a major factor of legitimacy and legitimization. As Ian Hurd states, 'legitimacy refers to the normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed. It is a subjective quality, relational between actor and institution, and defined by the actor's perception of the institution'. vii The limits of top-down state-building interventions in terms of building legitimacy on the ground has already been analyzed by many scholars. However, departing from Hurd's definition of legitimacy, this article explores the narratives of resistance to the international interventions in Kosovo and Timor-Leste, hinting at the paradox of statebuilders being deliberately and firmly isolated yet highly visible at the same time. In that regard, one has to agree with Orford that most internationalist accounts of post-conflict reconstruction too often serve to obscure the power relations that intervention produces, and the exploitation that it enables, hereby silencing these voices of contestation. viii This contribution furthers this research agenda by providing a specific analysis of the local resistance experienced in Kosovo and Timor-Leste, while building bridges with other case studies such as Afghanistan, Cambodia or Namibia.
The 'more is better' approach and its implications
There is a general consensus, in both policy and academia, that reconstruction of the sovereign state is necessary and that state collapse necessitates external assistance in a transitional period. In the exception, one could find a certain number of academics who defend the idea that societies experiencing major crises should be allowed a 'fresh start'. Weinberger doctrine, which states that every resource and tool should be used to achieve decisive force against the enemy, minimizing US casualties and ending the conflict quickly by forcing the weaker force to capitulate. It also presents interesting parallels with the Clausewitzian logic, for which war is an act of force, the application of which knows no logical limit by virtue of its escalatory dynamics.
One of the best examples of the 'more is better' framework is the widely-quoted RAND study on US-led state-building operations, directed by James Dobbins et al.. The study identifies five case studies (Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan), and contrasts these with the historic cases of Germany and Japan, that have according to them 'set a standard for post-conflict nation-building that has not since been equalled'. Their conclusion is that a high level of economic assistance and high numbers of troops deployed for a long time were crucial for the success of the two historic operations and can explain why recent operations showed little success: 'the higher level of input accounts in significant measure for the higher level of output measured in the development of democratic institutions and economic growth'. xiii Needless to say, the authors do not seem to acknowledge the sharp contextual differences existing between the cases, varying across nearly fifty years and taking place in substantially different international context. Actually, it seems to be the case with various studies taking Japan It is not enough to call trusteeship by another name in order to escape the opprobrium if this ugliness. It is not enough to merely assert a preference for human rights or some other value in order to embrace trusteeship while avoiding the stigma of empire. Nor it is enough to ground trusteeship in the universal claims of human rights in order to seek immunization from the reproach that often attaches to anti-paternal critiques.
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Bifurcation of the two worlds
More than an academic metaphor, one could also argue that the 'bifurcation of the two worlds' can be understood as a practical assessment of the situation in Kosovo and General reportedly answered 'boys will be boys' when confronted in a press conference. xxvii In this context, the acronym 'UNTAC' was quickly ridiculed as 'UN Transmission of AIDS to Cambodians'. xxviii As Steve Heder and Judy Ledgerwood, from the UNTAC Information Division, recognize:
UNTAC was seen as one more occupying army, one more distant, aloof, uncaring, and potentially dangerous authority to be outwardly subservient to, just to be on the safe side. As stories of outrageous acts by individual ill-disciplined soldiers piled up and were told and retold, UNTAC was also seen with horror as a horde of drinking, whoring, half-naked drivers who ran over people and couldn't care less. However, this feature of the international life tends to take a very specific political expression as the authority exerted by the international mission increases and takes the shape of an international administration. In fact, politicized by local actors, these issues tend to take a whole new meaning, targeting the exogenous character of the state-building agenda conducted by the international administrators.
In Timor-Leste, this 'bifurcation of the two worlds' has been exemplified mainly by two issues: the accommodation of UN officials in the early time of the mission on floating hotels chartered for the occasion, and the establishment of the UNTAET headquarters in the Governor's hotel, which has been formerly occupied by the Indonesian administrator. Furthermore, Chesterman sees the installation in the Governor's hotel and the rentals of floating hotels as demonstrations of the transitional nature of the mission. xlix However, certain political actors resented these decisions, as will be discussed below.
Furthermore, this political evolution has to be put into the wider context of the cultural upheavals created by the arrival of foreigners in a very traditional Timor-Leste, where the Church is a powerful and revered institution. l The differences of ways of life between internationals and locals are stark. As Murdoch reports: many women are scantily clad, a few even go topless at more secluded areas, while closer to town, along a winding track littered with beer cans, Timorese women swim at another beach wearing long sleeved shirts and shorts. The arrival of almost 10,000 UN peacekeepers and UN personnel in East Timor after last year's violence and destruction has raised concerns about a clash of cultures in the staunchly Catholic territory and is fuelling anti-foreign sentiments among Timorese. 'the UN will come with their white cars and their high salaries, and they will run around busily for two or three years. Then their mandate will expire, they will leave, and you will be left with almost nothing'. lxi After that, Gusmão and Ramos-Horta in their first meeting with Vieira de Mello asked the later to promise that the UN will not run Timor like it ran Cambodia. 'We don't want you to come and go and for us to be left shaking our heads and saying, was that a storm that just passed through here'? Vieira de Mello agreed and promised: 'we will not repeat Cambodia here'. face the contestation of two hundred UN employees, who signed a petition complaining they could not live on that. Jan Koller, the UN employee who was leading the movement against the cut, said that because of this policy, 'a lot of staff members will now have to start digging into their salaries at home', and that 'will affect worker's ability to take vacations, renovate destroyed accommodations, eat in restaurants and travel to and from work'.
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The white car syndrome: symptom of the bifurcation of the two worlds
Perhaps the best example of this gap between the two worlds resides in the study of forms of locomotion used by the two "social groups." More than anecdotal, the study of vehicles driven by internationals and locals help understand and picture the local resentment towards internationals. It is well known that vehicles are social status symbols, but in peace missions and especially in international administrations, they tend to acquire specific political references. The separation of the two "ways of life" is clearcut in this case.
As one UNMIK official recalled as early as 1999, 'we arrived at the outskirts of Pristina and navigated several traffic jams, comprising a jumbled mix of four-wheel-drive vehicles adorned with the emblems of the world's various humanitarian organizations, and a bevy of private cars with no licence plates'. lxix Similar accounts have been made in different missions. One United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) official deployed in Namibia recalls how 'scores of white vehicles -VW Golfs and Toyota fourwheel-drive Land Cruisers -were painted with "UN" in big block letters on either side, while storefronts and warehouses were renovated, and prefabricated structures transported in and erected to provide office space. UNTAG staff filled hotels to capacity, and caravans and tents were installed in outlying regions'. lxx Similarly, in Cambodia, 'already by the time of Vieira de Mello's early arrival, herds of Cambodian cyclos, or bicycle-powered sedan chairs, were being overwhelmed on the roads by gleaming white Toyota Land Cruisers belonging to UN agencies or humanitarian aid groups'. The good news is that humanitarian values are present and resonate in all cultures. The bad news is that the baggage -modus operandi, management style, white car syndrome, personal behaviour -that comes with the assistance is a source of considerable tension in the relationship between "outsiders" and "insiders". At best we are seen as competent, well-meaning and sometimes inconsiderate. At worst, as arrogant, culturally insensitive vectors of alien agendas.
lxxv In yet another publication, Donini stated that 'the definition of an "outsider" is, naturally, largely in the eye of the beholder. Foreigners in big white vehicles are outsiders par excellence'. From one country to another, the same accusations were made against 'those who place themselves above the law'; besides the road accidents, it was a 'lack of respect' that was emphasized most often; besides speeding, there was the recurring image of cars splashing mud as they went by or forcing their way through the road. xcix However, this resentment will take a specific form in Kosovo and in Timor-Leste, due to the unprecedented powers granted to the UN and the politicization of the issue by local actors.
Conclusion: new avenues for state-building
Lessons drawn from international experiments in Kosovo and Timor-Leste have led to the birth of a concept inside the organization, the 'light footprint approach' that came to be associated with the work of the UN official Lakhdar Brahimi. The light footprint approach -a term coined during the planning of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) -advocates that UN activities should be limited to those that are appropriate to the local needs and context, and that international staff should be limited to the minimum required, with an effort to ensure local capacity-building, so that nationals can take over from the UN as soon as possible. Hence, for Malone, 'Brahimi's approach is designed in reaction to many things he did not like in East Timor and Kosovo, mainly the idea of the UN governing, rather than assisting local leaderships in governing'. c It does not mean the end of intervention, it rather implies a different form of exercising authority in a foreign setting: 'to underscore the primacy of local over foreign concerns in no way means that the international partners have to accept the views of the local parties unconditionally and without discussion. But it does mean that arrogance is not acceptable, and humility and genuine respect for the local population indispensable'. ci Furthermore, it involves taking into account all aspects of international interventions, including unintended ones.
As this article posited, massive international interventions, especially international administrations, may lead to unforeseen consequences over local state-building processes. It can exacerbate the exogenous nature of the international presence, leading to a 'bifurcation of the two worlds'. In turn, the concept of bifurcation can be understood in terms of the bifurcation of the political and social spheres -the political response, namely direct governance, seems unfit to correctly address the social challenges of postwar statebuilding -or, more generally, in terms of the bifurcation of the international and local worlds. In the latter depiction of the concept, the 'bifurcation of the two worlds' can be seen to be present in most international interventions -albeit the scope of this international-local gap will mainly depend on the authority vested in the mission and policies adopted by international officials. Moreover, its effects can be mitigated by various institutional arrangements. Ombudsman institutions for instance can be instrumental in assuring a certain degree of trust between the international presence and the local population, thus helping the mission to mitigate the effects of its presence. This article has also further developed the concept of 'white car syndrome' as one salient form of the 'bifurcation of the two worlds'. In that regard, this contribution hopes to further the current research agenda on the critique of the liberal peace and the unintended consequences of statebuilding and peacebuilding missions, while at the same time building bridges between development studies and peace studies. 
